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Gilles Deleuze (January 18, –November 4, ) was one of the most to Deleuze's being better read among mainstream philosophers is the II: The Time-Image (); Foucault (); and The Fold: Leibniz and the.
Table of contents

He also looks at study of language and how there are two ways of treating the same language known as major or minor Deleuze, All of these ideas and concepts will know be looked at in more detail. A major language is a language spoken by the majority of the population, it is the main language of a country. It is given official status and used by the officials of a country. A minor language is less prestigious than a major language Ufomata, Deleuze has a problem with language: the imperialism of language which means the dominance of language over other structures of meaning Dorney, Majority implies a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it.

Numéros en texte intégral

Man holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than others. Majority assumes a state of power and domination. A person has to deterritorialise the major language so it is a problem of becoming Deleuze, Language deals with the art of the possible and is therefore fundamentally political.

We can distinguish major and minor languages because there is a distinction between a power of constants and a power of variables. The minor language is a variant on major language. A character element of a minor literature is that it is written in a major language.

Every language imposes power relations by means of the grammar and syntax use, lexical and semantics but such relations are not that stable. The use of a major language organizes and controls, regulates and limits. All languages, whether dominant or marginalized, can be used in a major or minor way Parr, But why do minorities like governments etc. Because the intent and effect of the major language is control, power and uniformity.

So minor language is a language which can be opposed to power structures and major languages. Government support the major languages that are able to survive alone on the number of the speakers of the languages. But, the minor languages need for survival emotional attachment and the defense of the group identity. The major languages are used for pragmatic purposes, official functions and of educated people. The minor languages are used socially, ritually, communally, economically and especially in the informal sector Ufomata, You will choose the language which will give you the most influence.

The more a language has the elements of a major language, the more it likely is to be affected by endlessly variations which can end in a minor language. All major languages do have minor languages behind it Parr, The World is always changing due to interaction between places and people. The world is not a constant which is undergoing changes but a places that is constantly changing.

A flow upon flow, variation upon variation Doel, , p. So when a company polluted the soil other people immediately want to do something about it. This other thing, enveloped within the sign, must be at once never- seen and yet already-recognized, a disturbing unfamiliarity. DR Underlying this act of'representation,' which continues to be dominant these days despite everything that has been said in the last four decades concerning the evils of representation, are two distinct transformations on the level of sense. First, sense is separated from its material expression, making these two things appear easily distinguishable, as if their relationship is contingent or purely accidental.

In other words, the singular marks that occur when a life makes its passage through language are often reduced to the different vagaries that surround the question of 'style. Every 'secondary writer' is first in line to accept this role and will denounce all the others who have gone before him or her as impostures, opportunists, or mere block-heads.

At the same time, everyone knows that Deleuze himself has written a great deal on other philosophers. Some might even go so far as to say that these are his best works, the works of a true philosopher, and not to be mistaken for those some- what bizarre manifestos he wrote with that other guy. His objective was not to clarify or to explain the work of the particular philosopher they examined. Deleuze himself described his approach to the genre of commentary by stating that it was a kind of 'buggery' enculage and his intention in every case was to take each philosopher from behind, 'giving him a child that would be his own, yet monstrous' N 6.

Many of Deleuze's best commentators have tried to ignore this statement, or have reveled in its iconoclastic energy which amounts to the same thing. Few have taken the statement seriously, preferring to understand it to apply only to his 'enemies,' Kant, for example, and not also to his philosophical 'friends' such as Nietzsche and Spinoza. Perhaps this is because, particularly in the case of Nietzsche, it is hard to imagine making him more monstrous than he already was for many.

What Deleuze is addressing here must be understood in the context of Platonic anamnesis, the proper function of memory, which is sometimes likened to a 'proper birth' where the child resembles its parent. Derrida has also addressed the issue of'bad or weak' memory within the concept of writing I'ecriture , which is 'exterior' to the internalizing function of the former. C3 E Xi marginalized representative by means of the powers accorded to a 'weak and externalized' memory.

In a certain sense, the Derridean method can be under- stood to be the fullest deployment of the logic of representation itself, to the point where representation exhausts itself thereby undergoing a strange reversal around the principle of identity that underwrites this logic: the production of the maximum of difference between the model and the copy. By contrast, Deleuze does not follow this strategy of representation, even though he seeks to liberate the copy from its adherence to a model by replacing the weak notion of the copy with the power of the simulacrum, or the double.

Something else happens when the commentator functions as a 'double,' in die sense that Deleuze has defined this role, and perhaps this definition restores to the art of com- mentary a more upright and direct presentation. As I suggested in the beginning, there is already something essentially 'under-handed' in the portrait of die commentator as a dedicated disciple or pure 'sub-ject' of the author. Rather, we might consider this conceptual persona according to the portrait that has been provided by Henry James in his story 'The figure in the carpet,' where the character of the commentator or critic will resort to any form of treachery in order to wrest the author's hidden design as his own source of joy, including designs on the author's daughter, only to end up a miserable wretch and loner.

After all, what could drive someone to devote a portion of their life to deciphering the stirrings that take place in the soul of another? Certainly not the truth, which is offered like hollow rationalization, an alibi placed before the reality of desire. And yet, it is not simply a matter of according the commentator a more 'realistic' or 'passionate' portrait of a rival claimant, a pretender, or a lover.

A question would have to be posed concerning the object under contention: 'What is being claimed? And yet, Deleuze does not understand this process of falsification morally, as a defect of representation, but rather vitally, as a supremely creative act; it is by falsification that the commentary functions as a Veritable double' and 'bears a maximal difference appropriate to a double. The fold and the unfold are not contraries, but rather, are continuous. Deleuze demonstrates this in his concept of the baroque interior where the fold of the inside is at the same time, on another surface, the unfold of the outside and vice versa.

In passing through the work the objective of unfolding some aspect, notion, or passage is not to reach a point where the work becomes a flat or empty space — the point of the complete unfold is impossible - but rather to discern the writer's manner of folding and unfolding in order to maintain what Leibniz called the vis activa the living potential that defines the force of creation. As Deleuze writes, 'Reading does not consist in concluding from the idea of a preceding condition the idea of the following condition, but in grasping the effort or tendency by which the following condition itself ensues from the preceding "by means of a natural force"' Fold Undoubtedly, this approach to the task of commentary involves a notion of repetition that is distinctly different from representation, which is premised on a too simplistic idea of the fold and of the unfold.

The act of unfolding, of tracing the fold of another mind, is a precarious exercise, one that is more of an art than a straightforward representation of knowledge in part, because the mind of another person is infinitely folded. Today we have numerous examples where the commentary fails, either by following too closely and failing to maintain the writer's manner of folding somehow independently of the commentator's unfold in which case the commentary becomes a bad copy , or by losing the sense of the fold entirely and thereby displaying the work on a flat and empty space as some- thing inert or no longer actual, as a frozen or rigidified profile of an object of the understanding.

It is ironic that every commentary already owes its existence to a more original repetition in which it takes part, even without being fully conscious of it, drawing both the work of the writer and the work of a commentary into a wave that lifts them and carries them along helplessly. The cause of this original repetition is difficult if not impossible to discern. In their last book, What is Philosophy? For each epoch they demonstrate the presence of distinct 'conceptual personae' each of which introduces a new image of thought.

Thus, we can point to a Platonic wave, a Cartesian, a Hegelian, and even today a Derridean or Deleuzian wave, all of which can be distinguished by the manner in which they remain enigmatic and folded even while the incessant number of commentaries break around their peak.

What distin- guishes one thought from another is a special kind of sign, which is often associated with the 'author-function,' as when we say 'Hegelianism' rather than 'Kantianism' or 'Platonism'; however, what this sign refers to is a multiplicity and also a manner of organizing a multiplicity. As Deleuze and Guattari state: There are no simple concepts There are no concepts with one compo- nent.

WP 15 Although repetition gives rise to a form that can be distinguished from other moments, it is primarily to be understood by its force, by the manner in which it maintains its fold even in die process of unfolding. As I stated above, every commentary already presupposes a certain force of repetition to which it belongs, even though this repetition is often understood as a 'problem' for which there must be a response e. Yet, all commentaries differ from one another precisely around the specific 'problematic' that they try to take up, to articulate, even to pose as a solution in their passage through the work of another philosopher.

Finally, it is for this reason that I wonder if there are, in fact, any commentaries; is there rather the repetition of various problems that have been grasped under eidier too general a concept of the representation, or too particular and individual a concept of the author? In my own passage through the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, the problem I have constandy engaged in the various essays that are assembled here is die problem of 'non-philosophy' — a problem that encompasses the domains of art, literature, cinema as well as science, which is not treated here to the same extent.

It is around this point that today philosophy seems to enjoy no more sovereignty than these other domains but rather, according to Deleuze's own understanding, constitutes the 'relation of the non-relation' with other planes of expression around the problem of a general co-creation. Another way of putting this is that the relation between philosophy and 'non-philosophy' takes the form of a general co-dependence and distribution among these other planes all of which are attempting to gather a little bit of the chaos that surrounds us and carries us along and to shape it into a sensible form.

A final aspect I would like to take up concerning the art of commentary is the degree of clarity that is often accorded to the work under the logic of represen- tation. Under this logic, a complete and clear understanding is already posed in advance. Recalling the allusion to 'the figure in the carpet' in the story by James, all that is needed is a certain angle of vision, or a moment of personal revelation, to make it appear. Nothing could be further from the truth and I take Deleuze very seriously around this point when he says that a thinker does not proceed methodically, but more like a dog chasing a bone, in leaps and starts.

As an illustration of this, we might take many of Deleuze's concepts where he resorts to a kind of poetic refrain: 'the Other Person as the expression of a possible world,' 'Time off its hinges,' or 'real without being actual, ideal without being abstract. It is precisely at these moments that the problem of expression in Deleuze's philosophy intersects with the art of concept creation, and we must suppose that there are still concepts that Deleuze could not resolve or express adequately and this might explain the repetition of various poetic refrains throughout his writings, refrains that he called 'ritournelles.

In other words, these refrains can also be understood as the points where Deleuze himself can be heard 'to stutter,' and it is important to remark that these refrains are present throughout his entire philosophical project, particularly from the period of Difference et Repetition to the final period of Qu'est-ce que la philosophic? Thus, if these refrains continue to remain obscure for us as well, it is not because they hide some profound meaning, the secret source of the author's joy, but rather because they express a more pragmatic problem of unfolding a plane that Deleuze says constitutes the ground of concepts.

This is a ground that Deleuze remarked many times by the term 'immanence,' and he cautioned that any concept that installs itself on this ground can only be partial, or relative, to 'the base of all planes,' although 'immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it' WP Thus, 'incapacity' defined as the inability 'to unfold,' 'to become immanent to Rather, it is the case of a problem in which there have already been multiple solutions in the history of philosophy, 'and each time we can say that the solution was as good as it could have been, given the way the problem was stated, and the means that the living being had at its disposal to solve it' B In each case, therefore, it falls equally to the writer as well as to the commentator to choose the best solution possible, assuming here that one of the possible choices also includes those solutions that have yet to be invented, or created.

As Deleuze writes in the conclusion of Difference and Repetition, Difference is not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to the requirements of representation.

The question whether it was 'always' subject to these requirements, and for what reasons, must be closely examined. From this, it is concluded that difference in itself remains condemned and must atone or be redeemed under the auspices of a reason which renders it liveable and thinkable, and makes it the object of organic representation. That difference remains an 'Idea' is what accounts for its absence under the conditions of what Deleuze calls 'organic representa- tion' since, as Deleuze writes, 'ideas are not given in experience, they appear as problems, and unfold as objects of a problematic form' LS What are die objects of a problematic form but the concepts by means of which philosophy proceeds in the sense of making a little headway through die chaos of sensation?

Concepts comprise a properly philosophical means of understanding the chaos that surrounds experience, and runs underneath it, in the sense that concepts attempt to grasp the diversity that makes up the conditions of experience. Therefore, philosophy progresses by means of its concepts, and there is no philo- sophical understanding per se that does not also represent an advance in the art of creating concepts.

However, this constitutes only one-half of the equation, since Deleuze immediately stipulates that philosophy does not only need a philosoph- ical understanding, but a non-philosophical one as well. Philosophy needs both wings to fly N As Deleuze argues, 'philosophy has an essential and positive relation to non-philosophy: it speaks directly to non-philosophers' N As an example of this duality, let us take up the question 'What is called thinking?

Nevertheless, if it is to remain immanent, that is, to share a plane of immanence that is occupied or populated by others, philosophy must presuppose an image of thought that becomes the 'ground' of its concepts. This is because only a non-philosophical understanding provides the absolute ground for phil- osophy, and philosophy can differentiate itself from this ground only by passing through it or over it in such a manner that its own image of thought becomes modified. However, in What is Philosophy? Rather, the 'plane of immanence' is given as the internal condition of thought; it is thought's 'non-philosophical' image, which does not exist outside of philosophy although philosophy must always presuppose it.

On an immediate level, this is the simplest thing to understand and subscribes to a simple notion of pragmatism. In order for its signs and concepts to be 'recognized,' philosophy must occupy a plane that is open and populous. How- ever, according to Deleuze, pragmatism begins to go astray when it confuses this immanent plane with the representation of a common sense cogitatio natura universalis , under the false presupposition that the more simple and direct understanding is for that reason more open, more gregarious, more 'democratic' and, consequently, is considered to be more immanent thanks to the qualities that define it.

However, it is precisely this model of 'recognition' that Deleuze most vehemently rejects from Difference and Repetition onward. Were this the case, then it certainly would raise a problem for readers of Deleuze: if philosophy no longer develops or refers its concepts to a plane occupied by 'common sense,' how should we understand this position? How will it commu- nicate? Would a philosophy that rejects a certain notion of common sense not risk becoming solipsistic, at least a little schizophrenic, or assuming the lofty attitude of 'the beautiful soul'?

While classical philosophy from Plato to Descartes has traditionally grounded its operation and its 'image of thought' on the ground of non-philosophy, the ground was often determined as common sense cogitatio natura. By positing a vulgar and common image of thinking, more often defined by 'error' or 'falsehood' than by stupidity, philosophy was able to differentiate its own image of thought, often by means of a special faculty that only philosophers possessed. However, what is distincdy modern about the style of philosophy that appears after the Second World War even though we can find certain forerunners of this style in certain exceptional or untimely thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Leibniz, Nietzsche and Spinoza is that common sense no longer offers a sufficient ground for the philosopher's conceptual activity; die statement everyone knows no longer marks the commencement or recommence- ment of the dialectical movement between truth and its negatives DR Consequently, the modern idiot is no longer the child of'natural man,' but is the one who is deceived or the one who deceives that is, the one who feigns idiocy while all the time pursuing his own ends in the world of action under the mask of a more sovereign ignorance.

Deleuze himself suggests this in his seminal essay 'Plato and the simulacrum,' where he shows that the classical figure of evil, shaped by 'finitude' or 'natural error,' has been supplanted by the appearance of this new idiot. His character is less likely to be found in the figures of the com- mon soul in either Plato's dialogues or Aristotle's DeAnima, than in the dramas of Shakespeare.

Of course, there are other idiots that can be found to populate Deleuze's philosophy, such as the figures of Artaud or the enigmatic 'Bartelby' from Deleuze's last work Critique et Clinique Deleuze asks: 'Can we, flailing in confusion, still claim to be seeking the truth? In other words, it is not from 'common sense' that the greatest problems can be posed, but rather from a more radical stupidity, or from a recalcitrant being that refuses to be rectified by the concept of reason, even to the point of willing the impossible and the unthinkable. We have an example of this in what Deleuze calls a 'primary nature,' illustrated by Kleist's Penthesilea or Melville's Ahab, as 'innately deprived beings who make nothingness an object of their will' CC If philosophy 'institutes' a plane, as Deleuze said, by 'presupposing' this plane in a certain sense as a position it already occupies, then the image of thought will be quite varied depending on the plane that philosophy presupposes as its condition.

For instance, although classical philosophy grasped this plane of immanence as the representation of the idea within natural consciousness, we cannot help but notice that today philosophy constructs its concepts upon other planes, most notably the planes expressed by science, art, literature and, most recendy, modern cinema.

We say that common sense is no longer posed as the beginning of a philosophical construction, in the sense that it no longer provides the ground of philosophy itself. Rather, as Deleuze writes, contemporary philosophy has taken on other measures - even those measures that 'belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness and excess' WP For example, it is a characteristic unique to modern commentaries on Descartes to highlight the passages in The Meditations on madness, or even to refer to the philosopher's dreams, including the dream that mysteriously ends with the inexplicable and strange gift of a water-melon.

In fact, it is precisely the cogito itself that appears to us now as a fantastic and illusory premise. Deleuze responds to this illusion when he argues that the possibility of thinking can no longer be understood as something innate or predestined for the cogito — that the mere possibility of thinking in no way guarantees the presence of a subject who is yet 'capable' of it. What does the above observation concerning the image of thought imply for us today? On one level, it implies that to an even greater degree contemporary philosophy erects itself on the ground of 'something that does not think' — for example, although it could be said that the unconscious thinks, it is certainly not an image of thought that we could say is rational.

Thus, this something that does not think in us returns as a question concerning the possibility of thought itself, the possibility that 'I am not yet thinking' a Heideggerian statement that Deleuze frequently employs to indicate the horizon of the greatest problem that phi- losophy must confront, but which it is incapable of confronting if it remains within the boundaries of the logic of representation.

These can be described as the different 'spiritual automatons' Deleuze that have assumed the position of the ground for contemporary philosophy, or could be variously described as the avatars of one great spiritual automaton which modern philosophers have sought to determine as the form of an immanence that is immanent to itself alone — as either pure consciousness or as a transcendental subject from which nothing, neither internal nor external, escapes WP On a second level, if philosophy can no longer extract its image of thought from simple common sense, and can no longer illuminate or correct the simple 'error' of the understanding, then its orientation both to natural consciousness and to higher principles such as the 'Good' is exposed to a more profound disorientation.

The creation of the concept of the fold in Deleuze's philosophy after the s is precisely a diagrammatic figure of this extreme disorientation, a state of suffering that Leibniz once described as a dizziness or even a 'swooning' I'etourdissement which occurs when the external and internal attributes of an object are confused and the soul loses its ability to orient itself to either the external world of perception or the interior domain of psychological represen- tation memory, dream, fantasy, etc. The crucial significance of the Baroque is that it provides a more precise understanding of a new image of thought that corresponds to how the mind is folded with the body or le corps , that is, of an absolute 'inside,' which is deeper than any interiority, which is co-implicated with a pure 'outside,' which is further away than any external object of percep- tion.

In fact, I will argue that by turning our attention to the state of extreme disorientation that 'the Baroque' often represents, we might be able to orient ourselves to the peculiar cause of our own state of suffering. As Deleuze asks, 'if "turning toward" is the movement of thought toward truth, how could truth not also turn toward thought? And how could truth itself not turn away from thought when thought turns away from it?

Here we note a precarious movement which, first of all, admits the possibility of a more profound disorientation than error or falsehood, which is the disorien- tation of thinking itself and, as a result, the point where the relation of thought and truth essentially assumes the form of non-relation. It is a turning-away from one another 'which launched thought into an infinite wandering rather than error' WP This sounds uncannily like die Heideggerian interpretation of the profound 'Error' of the metaphysical tradition descending from Plato; at the same time, something striking and distincdy non-Heideggerian occurs if we accept from this the possibility that this 'non-relation' becomes the only form of the relation between truth and thought.

Therefore, it is only by tracing this paradox that we are able to discover the contours of an event that caused - and continues to cause - their mutual disorientation. Can we not see, in the modern period, that each and every manner by which thought loses its way including deception and madness becomes precisely the means of locating the missing relation to truth?

Turning once more to the question of those other regions where contemporary philosophy attempts to ground its concepts and to 'institute a plane of immanence with the world' — since 'Philosophy is at once concept creation and institution of a plane' WP 41 - Deleuze defines a non-philosophical understanding as rooted in what he calls 'percepts and affects,' which points to the special relationship that philosophy entertains with literature, modern cinema and the arts. As Deleuze writes, 'percepts aren't perceptions, they're packets of sensations that live on independently of whoever experiences them.

Affects aren't feelings. They're becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives dirough them thereby becom- ing something else ' N As the domain proper of percepts and affects, the question of art can no longer be subordinated to die specialized or minor analytic of aesthetics; therefore, it is not surprising that Deleuze revitalizes this bastard form of philosophy following Kant and gives back to it a more vital sense of 'non-philosophy.

Gilles Deleuze versus Process Philosophy

Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we appre- hend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. For Deleuze, therefore, art now occupies the position of a pre-philosophical understanding that was formerly reserved for natural consciousness or common sense.

It could easily be demonstrated that much of a certain tradition of contemporary philosophy can be remarked by a fundamental encounter between itself and the domain of the modern arts. We have several prominent examples: Heidegger and poetry, Merleau-Ponty and painting, Derrida and literature. The question remains as to why? Why are philosophy and the different domains of modern art inevitably drawn toward an encounter with each other and, at the same time, to a point 'outside' of common perception or intuition?

It is as if both are under the spell of another point or dimension of the real which is hidden precisely because it is too open and chaotic, that is, too near for the power of intuition or imagina- tion and too far for the power of perception or concepts of the understanding to represent? The first response to this question would be that there is a relation between this outside and time.

If time is the form of subjective intuition in Kant, then Deleuze remarks that point where the classical subject is no longer capable of grasping time as the form of its own interiority the form of an 'inner sense' , and thus is no longer equal to the task of representing 'What happened? Contrary to the metaphysical tradition, which always grasps thought as an object of representation in the form of the 'idea' in Plato, 'reason' in Kant, or 'spirit' in Hegel, for example , Deleuze situates this object of non-relation on the plane of expression.

The concept of philosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari address it in What is Philosophy? Here again, we might discern the special power that is accorded to the role of art, literature and cinema in Deleuze's philosophy, since the condi- tions of thinking this form of immanence can no longer be said to be common or innate to the Ego, but can only be approached by means of a constructivism. Art researches the conditions for rendering this plane of immanence discernible by making the bare possibility of feeling more intensive and raising the minimal powers accorded to perception and intuition into a form of Vision.

Deleuze argues that if philosophy is to survive it is only through a creative engagement with these forms of non-philosophy — notably modern art, litera- ture and cinema. In other words, philosophy today can only hope to attain the conceptual resources to restore the broken links of perception, language and emotion. This is the only possible future left for philosophy if it is to repair its fragile relationship of immanence to the world as it is.

In its attempt to think the immanence of this world, which is neither the 'true' world nor a different or 'transformed' world, philosophy has returned to its original sense of 'ultimate orientation' as its highest vocation and goal. However, something new, and distinctly modern, occurs in the philosophy of Deleuze when we recognize that the sense of ultimate orientation is no longer described in terms of verticality — a dimension of transcendence that Deleuze takes great pains to avoid - but rather in terms that are essentially horizontal, or terrestrial.

As Paul Klee once wrote, 'If the vertical is the straight line, the uprightness, or the position of the Animal, then the horizontal designates its height and its horizon - and each one is entirely terrestrial, static. The creation of the concept of the Other Person represents perhaps the most profound and yet most subtle transformations in Deleuze's entire philosophical system, and it is not by accident that the concept of the Other Person is given as the first concept in What is Philosophy? In other words, Deleuze's philosophy 'begins' with the creation of the concept of the Other Person, and in Deleuze's attempt to orient thinking purely in terms of the horizontal relationship that is introduced by the problem of the Other Person, perhaps we have no better indication of the over- turning of transcendence as the highest problem for contemporary philosophy.

Time is out of joint: Hamlet's words signify that time is no longer subordinated to movement, but rather movement to time. Tlxi Sometimes it is in the nature of poetic saying to obscure rather than to clarify, and here we find only the announcement that 'something happened' that caused time to fall off its hinges, to increasingly appear for-itself to engender sensory-motor paradoxes. This event will signal a point of irretrievable crisis for philosophy itself since, as a result of this reversal, 'every model of truth collapses' and its models will ultimately fail in discerning the new relationships between the real and the imaginary, or to differentiate between true and false pasts TI If we accept the premise that the role of classical philosophy was to 'fix time,' that is, to save truth at all costs since time itself is the fundamental problem of philosophy , then we need to ask 'How is it that time can place truth in crisis?

As Deleuze argues, 'The power of falsity is time itself, not because time as changing contents but because the form of time as becoming brings into question any model of truth' N In response, we might notice that there is something in this event which corre- sponds to the nature of time discovered by chaos theory as a pure force of becoming, and Deleuze and Guattari resort to the figure of chaos in What Is Philosophy?

Deleuze, Gilles | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The figure of 'chaos' that Deleuze and Guattari invoke might give us a modern under- standing of the dinamen that also appears at the basis of Lucretian physics, which Michel Serres has described by the figure of the atomic 'spiral' or 'cyclone. As Deleuze and Guattari write, 'chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite' QP As Deleuze writes in Cinema 2, 'if we take the history of thought, we see that time has always put the notion of truth into crisis.

Not that truth varies depending on the epoch. It is not the simple empirical content, it is the form or rather the pure force of time which puts truth into crisis' TI Therefore, following more closely Deleuze's arguments concerning this notion of time in crisis, let us ask 'how,' or rather 'why,' this comes about? First, according to an argument that appears earlier in Bergsonism [] , because time is a constant becoming, which simply means that it refuses to 'be'; the whole of time is never 'given. Third, because Deleuze employing Bergson's notion of an elan vital] must admit to the existence of 'false problems' or places where the apprehension of time itself gets botched, where its concept loses its way and leads to an impasse.

It is the nature of all solutions to be temporary and partial, philosophical solutions included; 'and each time, we will say that the solution was as good as it could have been, given the way in which the problem was stated, and the means die living being had at its disposal to solve it' B According to Deleuze one such impasse occurs when time is confused with space, which leads us to think that the whole of time is given at a certain point, even if this point is 'idealized' and reserved for a God or a superhuman intelli- gence that would be able to see the whole of time in a single glance B In other words, as I will discuss in more detail in the next part, the Leibnizian construction first posits an irresolvable difference or confrontation between two forms of difference, and then, as Deleuze shows, resolves this confrontation in the most bizarre of manners: the creation of God, who occupies the position of the central monad, and of the a priori expression of a 'pre-established harmony' harmonia praestabilita which Deleuze likens to an automaton.

In other words, Leibniz solved the problem of time by constructing the series of incompossible worlds where divergent series could be developed without suffering contradiction; he saved truth 'but at the price of damnation' that is, by creating aborted becomings and cast-away worlds where certain singularities were assigned to spend eternity. However, invoking the third characteristic of time given above, Deleuze asserts diat the Leibnizian solution could only have been temporary and 'the crisis of truth thus enjoys a pause rather than a solution' TI First, we can say that if the Leibnizian solution gradually led to an impasse and failed to solve the problem of time, this is because he retained the classical function of God or Scientia Dei and, thus, spatialized time from the point where God could see the whole of time stretched out across incompossible universes in order to choose the world that was the 'most ripe' with possibilities.

Second, the Leibnizian solution was still dependent on what can only be phrased as the ethical 'character' of God's judgement; that is, he believed in a God who knew the difference between good and evil, and who could choose the world that exists on the basis of this innate knowledge of 'the best one. In the modern period, when the idea of God becomes predicated on a knowledge of 'History,' there were bound to appear inexplicable accidents, detours, dead-ends and, worst of all, stale possibilities and boring truths; explanations that failed to justify 'what happened,' or 'what's going to happen.

Turning now to the second guiding question, in light of die foregoing obser- vations, we must ask once more: What happened? What could have happened to place truth, again, into crisis?

I think I can see why. In capitalism only one thing is universal, the market. Negri: How can minority becoming be powerful? Or am I mistaken? A minority may be bigger than a majority. One might say the majority is nobody. The Straubs in cinema. Art is resistance: it resists death, slavery, infamy, shame.

On the one hand this third scenario relates to the most perfect form of domination, extending even to speech and imagination, but on the other hand any man, any minority, any singularity, is more than ever before potentially able to speak out and thereby recover a greater degree of freedom. Is communism still a viable option?

  1. The Future of Coal.
  2. Wind-Excited Vibrations of Structures;
  3. Gilles Deleuze: psychiatry, subjectivity, and the passive synthesis of time..
  4. Services on Demand.
  5. Differences in Becoming. Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze on Individuation - Alexandria.
  6. Aeon for Friends.

People are of course constantly talking about prisons, schools, hospitals: the institutions are breaking down. Open hospitals and teams providing home care have been around for some time. You yourself long ago suggested how work in Italy was being transformed by forms of part-time work done at home, which have spread since you wrote and by new forms of circulation and distribution of products. One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine—with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermo-dynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies.

But it would be nothing to do with minorities speaking out.